THE NEW REPUBLIC

Beyond the Middle Years

Irving Howe

What De Gaulle Had To Say

Jean Daniel

Back Again to Berlin

Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.

Talk About Testing

The Editors

June 12, 1961, 25 c

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Newsmen Without News

★ A thousand correspondents converging on a Summit conference from which there is no news produce their own nightmare. We have been there and seen it. Demand for copy is implacable: reporters bend like wheat before the wind of rumor or interview each other – or the pigeons. Khrushchev, of course, is always good for a story; the old ham loves a headline! There are communiques that don't say much; the Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting was typical – the hard news was Jacqueline's hair-do.

And yet these colorful shows are good fun; the public loves them. Top correspondents (except Walter Lippmann) couldn't risk prestige by staying away. Top principals (except de Gaulle) feel they must attend; don't suppose there isn't prestige for them too. No matter what fuming Republicans say, young Mr. Kennedy brings back to Washington a new aura; he is now a demonstrable member of the Summit club, he has confronted Khrushchev.

Here at home Republicans have been whooping it up; they have elected a Senator from Texas and General Eisenhower has said some pretty severe things about people who don't balance budgets. We have to admit it, there is an endearing quality about Eisenhower. Now that he has left the White House we hope he finds time to interest himself in public affairs.

Eisenhower had three recessions in eight years, four years with deficits and total red ink of $18 billion or more. He achieved this staggering feat in peacetime. Furthermore, some majestic quality about him made the folly of his fiscal conformity seem sound and reassuring. Whenever his fear of inflation seemed to flag he got it restored by a few days' quail shooting at the Georgia indoctrination school of George Humphrey. He came back from one such visit in February, 1959, after the Democrats' election victory, with an alarm in his eyes that fathered the recession from which we are recovering.

The story can be told once more. The economy was then on its way up and there was every reason to expect it would stay up if left alone. But it didn't and wasn't. Eisenhower produced the Great Inflation Bogey.

The bizarre thing, in retrospect, is that even Democrats stampeded: there was a competition to cut the budget. Lyndon Johnson got cheers from the Chamber of Commerce convention here by attacking "inflation." This reporter, prompted by Eisenhower's speech here last week, nostalgically leafed back through old columns. Yes, we noted (November 23, 1959) "the Administration's economy retrenchments fill some observers with genuine horror." They did not worry the Federal Reserve Board apparently; it was the local seat of the inflation fear complex and it boosted interest rates.

Well, our crystal ball is often clouded and we suspect there is a slight crack in the left ecliptic but under the subhead "Recession Ahead" we wrote (July 13, 1959) that "right at the moment Eisenhower is setting the stage for another recession (it will be his third) for the end of 1960," and that it would be due to "tight money on one hand and cutting the budget on the other." For once we were right though the forecast had less risk than might appear because Eisenhower produced two earlier recessions by the same infallible formula. Last week he urged Kennedy to use it some more.

Texas Tweedledees

★ We can't help feeling pleased that Republican Tower beat Democratic Blakley for the Senate in Texas. Why? Because a smiling, college ultraconservative is more fun than a morose, rich ultraconservative; because it helps give Texas a two-party system with conservatives in the GOP where they belong, and because it will be harder henceforth for Texas Democratic leaders to treat liberals like second-class citizens. When Lyndon Johnson boasts that he is a middle-roader he never seems to realize that this comfortable stance is only possible because he has liberals and conservatives on either side. Take the conservatives off his seesaw and he is dumped to the ground. Polarization of GOP conservatives as in Texas, we think, is going to happen elsewhere – Florida, for example, or Virginia. We have no illusions about isolationist Tower who is diminutive, pro-Goldwater and against the 20th Century. Yet we did find pleasure in the comment that although short his firm glance meets tall Texans right in the belt buckle.

We enjoyed another Texas quip in Karl Meyer's book *The New America* about "Pa" and "Ma" Ferguson, who used to alternate as governor – that bedfellows make strange politics.

That Terrible Tax Bite

★ We have been spending a good deal of time recently pitying the unfortunate owners of Dupont common stock who must receive $3 billion worth of General Motors shares under the latest Supreme Court antitrust divestiture ruling. Dupont bought GM shares at $2.09 and they are now $46. The parent Dupont supplied GM with automotive finishes and car fabrics, a mutually happy arrangement which the Court called illegal in 1957 and now follows (4-to-3) with a speed-up divorce order. Virgins threatened with death or dishonor could not plead more piteously against accepting this $3 billion profit and powerful lobbyists are working in Congress for a special rescue law. Why is this? Aha! because if they take the profit directly as shares of GM stock mailed out by Dupont the victims of involuntary affluence face a terrible tax bite. Yes sir, there the villainous tax gatherer stands, twirling his black moustachios, and snarling, "Proud beauty, now you are mine!" In point of fact at 30 percent the Treasury would take $870 million.

Such things just can't be in this warmhearted land of ours, and at any minute now our hero, Congress, will dash in with a cliff-hanger rescue, probably a law to make GM stocks in this special case taxable at the original $2.09.

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THE STAFF

Gilbert A. Harrison, Editor & Publisher
Helen Fuller, Managing Editor
Selig S. Harrison, Associate Editor
Robert Evett, Books & the Arts Editor
F. R. Ruskin, Assistant to the Publisher

Contributing Editors:

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Talk About Testing

There was nothing in the brief communique from Vienna to reveal whether or not the US, UK and Soviet negotiators in Geneva who have been meeting, except for a few recesses, since October 31, 1958, should start packing their bags or should keep on trying to write a treaty outlawing nuclear weapons tests. "Never before in history," Senator Humphrey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, recently wrote in the preface to a staff report on the subject, "have there been such painstaking formal discussions on the question of establishing an international control system to monitor an agreement covering an aspect of national armaments." Yet the result, at the moment, is pervasive discouragement.

General de Gaulle seems determined to create an independent nuclear capability – however modest. More formidable is the more-distant capability of the Communist Chinese. But the immediate cause for pessimism is the Soviet demand, presumably unmodified by what Mr. Kennedy told Khrushchev, that the test ban control organization be administered by one Western, one Eastern and one neutral member and that the vote be unanimous. Experts are not agreed whether this means that even if the Soviet Union approved an annual quota of so many on-site inspections a year, say 12, it would reserve the right to veto each and every proposed inspection, including the first 12. If that is the Soviet position, it would of course make a mockery of any multinational monitoring system. And it would convince many fair-minded observers of the futility of continuing the Geneva negotiations.

A running debate about the wisdom of the existing unmonitored moratorium has been going on for two years. The pro-testers (mainly the military, a strong segment of the Atomic Energy Commission and some influential Congressmen) want to test in order to improve smaller, more mobile tactical weapons. They argue that since present detection devices are not totally foolproof, we cannot be absolutely certain the Soviet Union has not been testing all along, and that to be safe, the United States must test to see that no nation "gets ahead."

The anti-testers (the State Department, the President's Science Advisory Committee and certain key members of the President's staff) do not accept the idea that more small nuclear weapons are needed to give the US sufficient deterrent power. They believe that the tactical value of these arms has been exaggerated, and anyway that it is foolish to assume that any nation could use such weapons without triggering a full-scale nuclear war. As for the possibility that the Soviet Union

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has been cheating, most of the anti-testers, including the present Director of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Glenn Seaborg, are skeptical: Even if the Soviets have been testing secretly, such small explosions could not appreciably affect the present balance of nuclear power, which is supported by a nuclear stockpile and delivery systems capable of devastating the world not once but many times.

Finally there is a related and strong argument on the side of the anti-testers: the effect of any unilateral resumption on world opinion, and not merely neutralist opinion. Renewed testing by the United States would, for example, be most embarrassing politically for the United Kingdom where this issue has long been a sensitive one.

A decision by the President to set a time limit on the Geneva negotiations and announce simultaneously a date for a resumption of tests by the US in the absence of accord, would, in the judgment of some, put pressure on the Russians to sign, or else. But such an ultimatum permits of no retreat. We would have to make good on our threat. And the fact that future US tests would be largely conducted underground or in the atmosphere, thus minimizing the danger of radioactive fallout, would not mollify world criticism. Moreover, as the protracted but finally successful Austrian treaty negotiations showed, patience *is* sometimes rewarded. Progress has been made at Geneva: over 18 articles have been accepted by both sides.

A second alternative might be to go on talking *and* test. But this in itself would probably torpedo the conference, as well as bringing a certain end to the present truce and seeming to contradict the President's March 14 statement wherein he expressed hope for an agreement because it would not "only contribute to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also have important implications for the future of disarmament and arms limitation negotiations and the future peace and security of the world."

Still, what if the President concludes – for reasons of vital security interests or domestic political pressures – that he cannot tolerate the present unmonitored moratorium very much longer? A third alternative might be to continue negotiations in order not to prejudice preliminary disarmament talks between the Soviet Union and the United States which are to commence on June 19 in Washington, prior to formal negotiations at Geneva on July 31. If a deadlock persists after a reasonable period during which every effort is made to find an acceptable formula for administering a test ban control organization, the entire matter could be referred back to the United Nations General Assembly, in line with the Indian Resolution adopted at the fourteenth session of the UN in 1959.

Because of the impasse over the veto, the conviction is spreading that since the Russians are not willing to take what we call the "first step" of an effectively monitored test ban, we will be wasting our time discussing the more extensive inspection and control required by disarmament. That deduction is as dangerous as it is unwarranted. The test ban issue is not the Rubicon. From the Soviet standpoint, our proposals amount to a demand that they give up something of value (secrecy) in order to prevent *our* testing – for Khrushchev has repeatedly expressed disinterest in further Soviet testing. What the Russians would prefer talking about is the broader question of how the world can either live with The Bomb (arms control), or live without it (disarmament). It is not an altogether unreasonable preference. When one stands at the edge of an abyss, as each side does, a leap may be safer than a step.

The Peace Corps Is Born

The initial announcement of the Peace Corps brought 25,000 inquiries to Washington. In mid-May, a spot-check on 7,100 filled-in questionnaires showed that of the 4,800 respondents available in 1961 (most of them college-trained), with the spouse also volunteering in the case of married couples, and with no dependents under 18, the skills available ranged from tractor and bulldozer operators, through auto mechanics, plumbers, electricians, masons, surveyors, canners, nurses, laboratory assistants in chemistry and biology, specialists in radio. These are exactly the middle-level skills whose absence in adequate quantity is limiting many development efforts of new nations.

Fifty-eight percent of the 7,000 who were recently invited to take a five-hour examination prepared by the Educational Testing Service with the advice of a Peace Corps staff psychologist showed up and took it, and it is hoped that between 500 and 1,000 volunteers will be overseas by the end of this year.

The proposed legislation that has just gone to Congress stipulates that members of the Corps must be US citizens at least 18 years old, in good physical and mental health, either unmarried or with a spouse also volunteering. They will actually do jobs, rather than merely advising or training others. They will be provided with a basic standard of food, housing, clothing, transportation, medical care and a $10,000 life insurance policy. They will be expected to serve for from two to three years; and when they return to the US they will get $75 for each month spent in service and professional counsel on relocating in the American community. While in service, they will have 30 days leave a year, and they will receive a small allowance to enable them to see other parts of the area in which they are living. The total budget for the Peace Corps

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is likely to approach $40 million for fiscal 1962, an average cost per volunteer of some $9,000.

Volunteers will not be regarded as accepted members of the Corps until the end of a three to six months training period which, while providing trainees with the skills, the language and the health information they will require, will also test the mettle of the applicant to live and to last in rugged environments. (One respected American organization which sent 25 teachers overseas recently found that at the end of a year, only a single teacher remained on the job.)

Three projects – all initiated at the request of the beneficiary countries – have so far been approved. The first is for feeder-road construction in Tanganyika, where insufficiency of surveyors to lay out connections with the main highway causes villagers to have to walk as much as 200 miles to bring their goats and corn to market. The second, carried out under contract with CARE, will bring some 60 volunteers to Colombia for six weeks of training in community development. CARE has been active in Colombia since 1954.

The third project is a rural teaching assignment in the Philippines. English is the unifying language of the country, but over the past 50 years the proficiency in English of the rural population is said to have been declining. So in 150-200 rural public schools the volunteers will serve as an added resource, over and above the normal complement of teachers, to provide training in language and general science.

"Mind If I Eat While We Talk?"

Laos—Two Steps Backward

Though President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev reaffirmed at Vienna "the importance of an effective cease-fire" and called for "international agreements for insuring [Laotian] neutrality and independence," the prospects for a Laos that is in control of its own national destiny have been reduced, as a practical matter, almost to zero.

When former Premier Souvanna Phouma says, as he did on June 3, that "we are not under Communist orders and Laotians do not want Communism," he is speaking for his own neutralist followers and those of the more militantly nationalist Captain Kong Le. But the strength of these elements has been progressively eroded by the Communists; even in the May, 1958, elections, when the Pathet Lao did not yet control more than half of the country, Souvanna Phouma's party won seven seats in the National Assembly while the Pathet Lao won nine. The very least that the Communists would be likely to get in any coalition regime would be control of key internal security posts (notably the Interior Ministry, which has jurisdiction over the Laotian border with South Vietnam now being used as a guerrilla corridor to Hanoi). The most that seems possible for the non-Communist forces is that the Communists, while consolidating their internal influence, might conceivably let Souvanna Phouma conduct a more-or-less unaligned foreign policy, resembling that of Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk. But only if the nationalist faction in the Pathet Lao itself proves much more powerful – and much more adroit – than British, French, Indian and US intelligence estimate would neutralism in Vientiane resemble that of New Delhi or Vienna or even Djakarta.

Until lately, there had seemed to be some chance that the non-Communist elements in the country might fight back from their present defensive position and marshal enough strength to compete successfully with the Pathet Lao in the projected general elections. That chance depended on there being an atmosphere of security and discipline under international supervision. But when the Vienna communique refers to "a government chosen by the Laotians themselves" (the word "elections" was not used) one suspects that the non-Communist factions are in reality being left to fend for themselves at the bargaining table. If the US is not able at Geneva to win Soviet concurrence in effective international supervisory machinery, then the President's bluff ("if these attacks do not stop, those who

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support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response") will finally have been called.

The President may regret having said too much, too soon during his illustrated TV lecture of March 23. Public opinion was encouraged to regard Laos as a test of US will. It has already exposed him to some derisive comments from Vice President Nixon about words that are not matched by deeds, and the new Republican National Chairman is speaking darkly of a possible "under-the-table deal" at Vienna. The pity is that Mr. Kennedy in effect asked for this kind of political retaliation when he pledged the nation to an improbable, militarily impractical result, and even hinted that US troops might be used to impose that result. He did not fool the Russians or the Chinese by his bold words, for they too know the limited capacity of the US to intervene effectively in Laos.

In the short run, the best that has been possible since January 20 has been a defeat. It is a defeat in which the previous Administration is, if anything, more deeply involved than Mr. Kennedy. But we lean to the view expressed by Harry Simple in his dialogue in these pages with Louis J. Halle: "We live . . . in a world that is complex and fluid, a world of constantly shifting balances and alignments in which no advance, whether on our side or the other, is final. . . . Laos might be in the Russian camp for a while, then in the Chinese camp, then in our own – whatever ideological label it happened to bear." No country is "lost" so long as lines of communication to the outside can be kept open and even a nominal neutrality prevails. If the US now gives encouragement to the Laotian nationalist elements that it has declined to support for the past five years, the regime in Vientiane may, in time, appear just as unreliable and exotic a political growth to the Russians and the Chinese as it will to the US.

Public Defender Minow

Newton N. Minow's maiden speech as chairman of the Federal Communications Commission was the clearest "meme, mene, tekel, upharsin" the television industry has been given. But the tentative network programming for next season indicates that the public is doomed to suffer through more of the predictable violence, sadism, sex, puerile commercials and assorted hokum, slapstick and claptrap, with only a slight leavening of quality.

Of the cumulative 73.5 hours of prime evening time per week, the three major networks plan to devote 59 hours, or almost six-sevenths, to "action-adventure" shows, situation comedy, variety and quiz shows and movies – the kind of lowest common denominator that led the new FCC chairman, in his rousing speech before the National Association of Broadcasters, to describe TV as a "vast wasteland" notable for implausibility, offensiveness and boredom.

The industry has moved quickly to block Minow's efforts to improve programming, and in this cause, it will have the cooperation of many members of Congress. At least 15 Senators and Representatives have direct or indirect financial interests in commercial radio or TV stations. The figure was considerably higher a few years ago – before the Congressional investigation of payola, rigged quiz shows and the like.

Under pressure from the industry, to which freedom to make money takes precedence over the public's right not to be insulted, the House Government Operations Committee last month voted to reject the first new weapon sought by Minow – a reorganization plan to streamline FCC procedures and increase the power of the chairman. "We can't do the job with our present rules," Minow argued, but the Committee – and an FCC majority – saw it differently.

Commissioners Ford, Hyde, Lee and Bartley (the latter a nephew of Speaker Sam Rayburn) opposed the provision giving the chairman authority – if a majority of the commission agreed – to delegate work to senior employees, examiners and individual FCC members. The idea was to free the commission as a whole from mandatory hearings on routine cases and give it more time for policy-making. The lack of attention to policy-planning and coordination is one of the most serious defects of almost all the federal regulatory agencies, the FCC included. The committee's action virtually assures that the FCC reorganization plan will be defeated.

Subsequently, Rep. Oren Harris (D, Ark.), chairman of the House Interstate Commerce Committee, introduced legislation to do just about everything the FCC reorganization plan would have done. But the Harris bill contains a big, almost-unnoticed joker: A minority of three commissioners could rescind any delegations of authority.

Beyond reorganization lies an even tougher problem. The FCC can regulate only individual radio and TV stations, not the huge networks which supply more than three-fourths of the programs shown in the prime hours. With its licensing power, the commission can do something about programming by individual stations, but when the crackdown comes, the licensees will plead the strictures of economics – they must draw most of their big, popular programs from the networks. There can never be any big improvement in TV without some federal supervision of the networks.

The commission last year endorsed proposed legislation which would have put the networks under FCC regulation, but the amendment was withdrawn in the House when Harris said his committee would study the matter during this session. Reliable sources say, however, that no such inquiry has been scheduled and

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nothing is in prospect. It may be left to Senator Kefauver to skin the cat another way – by investigating the monopolistic character of television.

Minow, who at 35 is one of the brightest and most personable of the New Frontiersmen, believes that the television industry may win battles and still lose the war. His May 9 speech to the broadcasters brought a deluge of letters – about 3,500 thus far and only five or six percent of them hostile to his position. Of the letters analyzed to date 581 complained of too much liquor, crime, violence and sex in their TV fare; 426 cited the adverse effect on children (Minow estimates that most youngsters now spend as much time watching TV as they do in the classroom), and 356 were worried about the effect on public morality.

Death of a Dictator

The assassination of Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina introduces another element of instability into an already turbulent Caribbean. Since the withdrawal of US marines in 1930, *El Benefactor* completely dominated the Dominican Republic, sharing power with no one and making no provision for his death or retirement. Three decades of ruthless brutality have made surviving Dominicans fearfully non-political; the atmosphere in the capital, with informers everywhere and armed traffic policemen at every corner, is reminiscent of George Orwell's *1984*. Three out of five Dominicans are illiterate; four out of five are peasants who accept poverty as part of the natural order. Incessant government propaganda, unfamiliarity with any rule but that of Trujillo, and the fact that things are so much worse in neighboring Haiti have smothered revolutionary discontent. Hundreds of middle-class conspirators, arrested in January, 1960, are still serving long terms in La Victoria prison, and exiled opponents of the regime are widely scattered and disorganized.

Over the longer term, however, Trujillo's death seems certain to expose his satrapy to the winds of change blowing so strongly elsewhere in Latin America. General Rafael "Ramfis" Trujillo, Jr., who has temporarily taken over, is a playboy who seems incapable of the sleepless vigilance that it takes to maintain a caudilloship. Other aides, like President Joaquin Balaguer and Police Chief John Abbes Garcia, were puppets. With "the Chief" gone, the tightly-organized Army hierarchy may fall prey to internal power struggles, opening the door to democratic or Castro-style revolution. The regime also faces an economic crisis as a result of declines in the world prices of sugar, coffee and cacao, heavy expenditures for armaments, and the OAS boycott on shipments of oil and automotive parts.

Two US aircraft carriers are standing by in case of trouble. But Washington's long record of support for the dictatorship, which came to an end last year because of Latin American pressure and the Castro menace, will make it difficult for the US to act with moral authority in any crisis that may arise.

Standing by Wright

Late last summer, as the clouds of the school integration crisis were gathering over New Orleans, this journal, in common with many observers, noted one most encouraging factor: the federal district judge who would be exercising jurisdiction was a man of commanding professional reputation, J. Skelly Wright. It was extremely unlikely, therefore, that the country would witness in this instance any judicial fumbling, such as took place in Little Rock in 1958, or Montgomery last week when federal Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., issued injunctions that lumped together the Klan and Martin Luther King in the category of "extremists." Judge Wright fully lived up to his reputation. He exerted the judicial power skillfully and firmly, resourcefully in light of the law laid down for him by his judicial superiors, but also with a sense of the limits that attach to all judicial authority.

His reward, if Sen. Russell Long of Louisiana has anything to say about it, is to be denied a promotion that would almost certainly have been his by acclamation, but for the events of last fall. The place to which Judge Wright should be promoted is a seat on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, whose jurisdiction covers the Deep South and which has played and will continue to play a signally important role in the solution of all civil rights problems. Senator Long is up for reelection next year, and it has seemed to him profitable to declare Judge Wright personally obnoxious and thus try to block his nomination.

For the sake of elementary justice to an able and faithful public servant, and for the sake of the morale and continued independence of all Southern federal judges, the Administration must make and rigidly stand by the logical nomination for the Fifth Circuit vacancy from Louisiana. If there is a fight, let the country know what Senator Long has against Judge Wright, and let the country observe and judge the open operation of the disreputable old prerogative of any single Senator to kill a nomination he deems "personally obnoxious." There never has been anything edifying about this ridiculous practice. No doubt, Senator Long, with the aid of Chairman Eastland of the Judiciary Committee, will be able to block confirmation of Judge Wright for many long months. But months of vacancy in judicial places have been tolerated for poorer reasons. Any nomination other than Judge Wright's is unthinkable.

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NO MEETING OF MINDS ON AN "ATLANTIC TROIKA"

What De Gaulle Had To Say

Paris

John F. Kennedy is very popular here. He is young, handsome, dynamic, and he represents the United States. Finally, at the moment, the French like to have many friends. And so the people of Paris, despite a downpour which would normally have kept all casual parade-goers indoors, made a point of giving him a welcome which went far beyond the requirements of courtesy. General de Gaulle himself made an obvious effort; the French Chief of State wished to give the President of the United States visible evidence that, despite any disagreements, everything would be done to reach a meeting of minds. Nonetheless, as we now know, the will to agree was powerless to erase the principal difficulties.

Raymond Aron has just written: ". . . The Atlantic Alliance is faced today with three problems on the military level. Two have arisen as a result of French policies, the third as a result of the preferences of the new American Administration. The Paris Government has underway a program of manufacturing atomic and strategic weapons, and it is opposed to various methods for integrating these forces. . . . For his part, President Kennedy and his advisers consider it dangerous to envisage the use of tactical atomic weapons under any circumstances whatsoever, and they would like their NATO partners to increase their contribution in number and equipment of divisions placed at the disposal of NATO. . . ."

The problem is clearly posed; it had not changed by the time the de Gaulle-Kennedy conversations began. In addition, a book has just been published in Paris, written by the United States President – *The Strategy of Peace* – which contains a passage that has been read with very special attention by all French political observers: "Once China, or France, or Sweden, or half a dozen other nations successfully test an atomic bomb," former Senator Kennedy said in November, 1959, "then the security of both Russians and Americans is dangerously weakened." Then, a hundred or so pages further on: ". . . We must consider whether it is really wise to maintain a situation in which information is denied to our friends which we know for certain is available to our potential enemies and which places a premium on our allies developing, at great expense, nuclear capabilities which in themselves are of a limited military significance. We should face the fact that the fundamental purpose of the French atomic bomb is not to increase French capabilities, but to increase its stature in the Alliance. The French bomb is aimed toward Washington rather than Moscow. This is an odd way to run an alliance."

This last sentence has, obviously, been the subject of rather sharp comments within the French Government; there has been some curiosity about how the President of the United States could alter his view after having spoken so definitively. The truth is that no one believes Mr. Kennedy has changed his mind. But it is believed that he is not now in a sufficiently good trading position to defend his earlier view. In very diplomatic terms, General de Gaulle justified his desire to have his own atomic weapons and to enter into a three-way Atlantic partnership ("the Atlantic Troika"). He did so by pointing out the need the United States has of Europe in order to avoid such blunders and humiliating retreats as have been experienced in Cuba, Korea or Laos. How, de Gaulle asked, can France and, for that matter, Europe in general have blind and unconditional confidence in the capacity of US leadership to protect all its allies? This is how de Gaulle defends a foreign policy which is beyond doubt nationalistic and one which the Russians still hope offers opportunities for undermining NATO. It has not been possible for the two Presidents to come to an agreement in Paris on this basic question. The French aspire to participate in the Anglo-American exchange of atomic secrets and in regular consultations of an Atlantic Directorate, perhaps even an official Directorate. The attitude of Mr. Kennedy suggested some possibility of compromise in this direction. But General de Gaulle cannot have been satisfied with this.

Insofar as preparations for the subsequent Vienna talks were concerned, de Gaulle appears to have adopted a categorical attitude: Berlin must be defended, no matter what. It is generally believed that he also gave Kennedy the benefit of his knowledge of Russia under Stalin, and of Russia under Khrushchev. According to de Gaulle, Khrushchev does not want an atomic war and will hesitate to touch off a local conflict in any area where the possibilities for extension of such local conflict are too great. The President of the French Republic pointed out at the same time that if, with regard to Berlin, the British, the French and the Americans were to feel the need for tripartite action, this need could be established in principle and could justify the three-way Atlantic Directorate which de Gaulle wants.

JEAN DANIEL

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WHEN PREMIER FANFANI COMES TO WASHINGTON

Italy and the New Frontier

Rome

One week after the election of President Kennedy, a group of some 200 Italians – members of Parliament, labor leaders, social scientists, intellectuals in general – met to celebrate the event. They were mostly people in their 30's and 40's, representing a wide political spectrum: Christian-Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans, Radicals, Nenni Socialists. What brought them together – as pointed out by Franco Malfatti, a young Christian-Democrat close to Premier Amintore Fanfani – "was the emotion we felt for what has just happened in the United States, the fresh impetus it has given to our pondering our own national problems, and the feeling that, as we struggle on to make our country at last into a modern democratic nation, we can now look forward, once more, to a rendezvous with America." That will be the spirit that animates Premier Fanfani when he talks with President Kennedy in Washington on the 12th and 13th of this month.

In Italy, the excitement aroused by the change of Administration in Washington is proving durable for two main reasons. First, developments of the last few years have promoted a substantial regrouping of political forces into two broad alignments: the conservatives and the progressives. Second, the delicately poised balance between the two alignments may be tipped if American influence, which in past years has appeared to be working on the conservative side, should now shift to the progressive side.

In postwar Italy, the direction of political affairs has been in the hands of Christian Democracy which, lacking an absolute majority, has generally ruled with the support of the small moderate parties of the Right (Liberals) and of the Left (Social Democrats and Republicans). Since 1948, when those four parties first joined in a centrist government coalition, the country has experienced a very rapid economic growth: gross national income has more than doubled and per capita income has increased by 90 percent. During the same period, however, the government parties' share of the popular vote has dwindled from 62 to 52 percent; the Communist vote has risen from less than 20 to 24 percent and the Nenni Socialist vote from less than 12 to almost 15 percent of the total.

Italy has had 10 governments since 1953, and most of them have been stalled on dead center throughout their precarious tenure. This has not only prevented a more equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth; but the growth itself – unattended by a modernization of institutions, of administrative practices and more broadly of relations between citizenry and government – has thrown into sharper relief the backwardness of the country's structural framework and thus contributed to increasing dissatisfaction.

In a Sicilian village, great hopes may be aroused by the building of a dam; but the hopes turn sour when the precious water wastes away because neither the landowners nor the government authorities have provided for the necessary canalization network. In another village, the canals may have been dug, but the water supply is tightly controlled by the Mafia.

Unemployment has been practically wiped out in the North, where new factories continue to draw manpower from the countryside. But those new recruits of industrialism must either move into the shantytowns that ring the big cities or spend many hours a day in slow, old and overcrowded trains. In the South, most of the hundreds of thousands of unemployed are unskilled laborers, many of them illiterate: "Still," a local politician told me recently, "when we asked the Education Ministry to finance some vocational training in my home town, we were told that the money was available but only for another chair of Latin and Greek in the city's college!"

To open a pharmacy in Italy, you must get a dozen permits from different government and local bureaus; but then there is nothing comparable to a Pure Food and Drug Act or to an FTC Code on advertising. There is no antitrust legislation, either; and the annual reports by most big corporations, scanty as their information is, reveal practices that would grossly violate US legislation on public utilities, holding companies and monopolistic activities. While the "big boys" can take advantage of those gaping holes in the legislative structure, they are also equipped to find short cuts through the maze of laws and regulations which otherwise entangle the small guy. No wonder that to the average Italian it is always "they" and never "we" when he talks about the State.

Much greater progress could have been made but for the veto power wielded by the conservative elements (right-wing Christian-Democrats and Liberals) within the center coalition. This veto, rooted in the small margin of majority held by the Center, can be overcome only through a major realignment of political forces. Such a realignment has been talked of ever since a large segment of the Socialist Party, led by Pietro

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Summer Schedule

During the summer months, The New Republic will not appear on:

July 17 *July 31*
August 14 *August 28*

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue dated September 4.

Nenni, began to loosen its ties with the Communists.

Progressive-minded groups within the Center alignment believe that the Nenni Socialists are not yet eligible for full partnership in the government. But they maintain that a government, solidly controlled by forces fully loyal to the democratic institutions and to the Western Alliance, can and must accept Nenni Socialist support in Parliament in order to put across, over conservative opposition, long overdue reforms.

In April, 1960, Fanfani tried to form such a government and actually reached an understanding with Nenni, based on three key domestic planks: more effective government controls in the electric power field; development and modernization of the school system; extension of local self-rule, as called for by the Republican Constitution of 1947. But Fanfani was forced to give up by a threatened revolt of Christian-Democratic right-wingers, backed by conservative economic and church groups. The pendulum then swung all the way to the Right and the Christian-Democrats, for the first time, depended on the neo-Fascist votes in Parliament. Within three months, widespread popular revulsion against the emboldened neo-Fascists brought the country to the verge of civil war. To avoid the worst, Fanfani agreed to come back at the head of an "emergency" government, which received the support of the small center parties and the abstention of both Nenni Socialists and Monarchists.

After the peak years of the Marshall Plan, US influence on Italian domestic affairs underwent an inevitable decline. And with the coming to power of the Eisenhower Administration, what was left of that influence was mobilized in favor of conservative groups and big economic interests. Ambassador Clare Booth Luce was known to feel that political stability would best be ensured by a shift to the Right, which would bring the Monarchists into the government. Even conservative papers waxed indignant over reports in the US press that Mrs. Luce had recommended a slow-down in economic aid to Italy because the new Chief of State, President Gronchi, was thought to be neutralist-minded and favorable to an understanding with the Nenni Socialists (the first charge, at least, has been disproved by facts). When Mrs. Luce fell ill, Roman wits quipped that she was suffering from "gronchitis."

In the last few years, nothing has happened to change the feeling that the US is much more interested in military solidarity and in preventing anything from rocking the boat than in promoting the reforms required to give the democratic regime wider popular support. With some exceptions, US officials, in their political and social contacts, have continued to convey the impression that the best forces with which to work are to be found in the conservative camp, while the anti-Communist Left (let alone the Nenni Socialists) are too radical, if not outright dangerous.

To progressive-minded Italians, this attitude is the more surprising since it would be necessary to go back a generation or longer to find an American counterpart of the kind of *status quo* which the Italian conservatives are striving to maintain – a *status quo* directly responsible for keeping the Italian Communist Party the strongest in the West. Italian conservatives have certainly been vocal advocates of a pro-Western policy; but now that the Kennedy Administration is calling for fuller mobilization of allied resources in the common interest, their response is much less enthusiastic than that of the democratic Left. When Ambassador Harriman visited Rome early in March, for instance, the conservative press hastened to claim that Italy, in spite of her large reserves of gold and foreign exchange, could not make major contributions to "helping the dollar" or greatly increase her aid to the underdeveloped countries because she must concentrate on her domestic problems; a peculiar argument, indeed, from the very same quarters which obstruct rather than help the governments' efforts to deal with those problems.

As to the Nenni Socialists, it is true that they still proclaim their allegiance to the principle of neutralism. But Nenni has publicly stated that "the issue nowadays is not whether Italy should remain in the Atlantic Alliance but whether she should pursue, within the Alliance, an international approach closer to Macmillan's than to Adenauer's." He has further indicated that he would be ready to face up to a complete break with the Communists and with the pro-Communist wing of his own party, if there is some concrete evidence that he can work with the democratic forces to give Italy a New Deal. Pointing at a picture of the General Electric officials being taken to jail for violation of antitrust laws, a man very close to Nenni told me recently: "When something of the kind happens here, I'll feel that our country, too, is on its way to becoming a modern democracy!"

LEO J. WOLLEMBORG

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Back to Berlin

by Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.

It did not take long for the Presidents of the United States and France to find a "complete identity of view" on the need to resist any encroachment on the freedom of or access to West Berlin. Presumably that view will be accepted happily by Chancellor Adenauer and, perhaps with more reluctance, by the British Prime Minister. This is gratifying news, though its precise meaning is not yet known. Nor is it known whether US policy is still based on the imposing cornerstone cliché of the past decade, which is that the solution of the problem of Germany – of which Berlin is a part – must be the reunification of Germany via free elections.

It seems to me that there are other possible policies which deserve consideration. Specifically, I propound the idea that there are three issues which are commonly discussed as if they were one but which are really quite separate. They are: (a) the freedom of West Berlin and West Germany; (b) the reunification of Germany; and (c) the conclusion of a treaty or treaties of peace with a reunified or divided Germany.

As to (a), there is little to be said. If anything justifies the risk of war, it is the prevention of the forcible subjection of the people of West Berlin (and *a fortiori* of West Germany) to the rule of the East German Government, which is to say the rule of Soviet Russia. That appears to be the position of the President.

As to (b), the United States has repeatedly declared – formally in the Final Act of the London Conference of 1954 and the Convention on Relations between the United States, the United Kingdom and France and the Federal Republic of Germany of the same year, and less formally on many occasions before and since – that its fundamental goal is "the achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany." This assumes the wrong answer to several questions which have not been much canvassed in public.

Is there in fact any real possibility of the achievement of this goal? I think the answer is clearly that there is not. It is simply a fact, however distasteful, that no such peaceful reunification can take place without the consent of the Soviet Union. "A fully free and unified Germany" would presumably be free to gravitate into the Western orbit; indeed the United States seems (or at least the late Secretary Dulles seemed) to assume that such a unified Germany would be bound by the Federal Republic's present commitments to the NATO powers. Whether or not this is legally valid (and the Federal Republic itself appears to take the position that it is not), it is unimaginable that the Soviet Union would consent to the reunification of Germany on terms which left the new Germany any such choice. It is unlikely that it would consent even to the creation of a neutral reunified Germany. Germany is not Austria, and Soviet Russia and its client states in Eastern Europe have reasons, which I am not prepared to label hypocritical or nonsensical, for not contemplating with equanimity the re-establishment of a nation of more than 70 million Germans, many of them with irredentist ideas, in the middle of Europe. Moreover, a free and unified Germany, no matter how neutral, would mean the detachment of East Germany, with all its important industrial and military potential, from Soviet control and, in all likelihood, the virtual extinction of the Communists as an important political factor in any part of Germany. Russia has been quite frank in its rejection of honest elections in East Germany; that rejection is understandable if not creditable.

The Soviet Union would, in brief, be unlikely to consent to the reunification of Germany except in circumstances in which it was certain that the reunified Germany would become a docile member of the Communist bloc. Such circumstances do not, and in the foreseeable future will not, exist – and if they did, it is safe to predict that the Western powers would lose their enthusiasm for reunification. Indeed, I should not like to assert dogmatically that Soviet Russia would acquiesce in the reunification of Germany even as a Soviet satellite. It might prove somewhat indigestible.

I conclude, therefore, that this goal of our foreign policy suffers from the disadvantage that it is wholly impossible of achievement.

Would the reunification of Germany substantially benefit the United States, or its European allies? I doubt it. Our experience with the Second and Third Reichs was not such as irresistibly to compel the conclusion that the existence of a united German nation in *Mittleeuropa* ought to be an immutable aim of Western policy. The world has changed greatly in the last 16 years, but probably not so greatly as to render completely irrelevant the experience of the preceding three quarters of a century. I suggest this policy of the US rests

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JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., *who teaches at Yale University Law School, served with the US High Commission in Germany during negotiations which led to the establishment of the Federal Republic.*

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on piers no more substantial than its fine, brave, liberal sound, force of habit and aversion to strenuous thinking, the crumbling remains of the 1952 "roll back the Iron Curtain" policy, and the idea that reunification is close to the heart of our friends in West Germany. Of these only the last has even superficial cogency.

Do the Germans really want reunification? Here I speak with less confidence, for I am not German, though I have spent several years in that country. I am prepared to concede that the East Germans (aside from the minority, whose size is hard to estimate, who are wedded to the present East German regime) probably *do* want it, but I am not prepared to concede that this ought to be a major factor in our calculations, any more than is the equally reasonable desire to be free among what is probably still a majority of Poles, Hungarians, Rumanians and maybe even Czechs.

As for the West Germans, while it is probable that many or most of them have a sentimental affection for the idea of reunion, I think it improbable that many of them want it badly enough to run any serious risk of war or to pay any other considerable price. Even in 1952, when I was last in Germany, it seemed to me that there was a good deal more talk about reunification (mostly by politicians and in the newspapers) than there was real feeling on the issue. I have the impression that in 1961 there is less of even talk than there used to be. West Germany and its people are doing very nicely. The refugees who went West (and who were, by and large, the one sizable group who sincerely cared about reunification) seem no longer to be an unabsorbed and homogeneous bloc of discontented people, so far as one may judge from the decline of their political parties. The Communist Party is a negligible factor in German politics. I think many West Germans might find embarrassing and troublesome the acquisition of whatever number of convinced Communists there are in East Germany – and there may be a good many. For these and many other reasons I am highly skeptical of the proposition that the United States ought to treat the reunification of Germany as a vital interest of an ally.

In short, I do not believe that the peaceful reunification of Germany is now remotely possible, and I do not believe that the reunification of Germany ought to be of paramount concern to the United States or its allies, including the Federal Republic. It is probable that in the very long run Germany will be reunified in one way or another, but it will not be the result of diplomatic maneuvers by the Western powers.

As to (c), our policy has been not to recognize and not to sign a peace treaty with the so-called German Democratic Republic. In part, of course, this policy is a function of *b*. Should we abandon *b*, there are still some arguments for maintaining our present course. I do not think them impressive. First, though the DDR is, of course, a totalitarian state, we recognize a good many such, Communist and otherwise. It is more Stalinist and generally more repellent than the average Communist government, but it would be unjust to say that it smells worse than the Third Reich, with which we managed to maintain diplomatic relations from its inception until December 11, 1941. Secondly, recognition and signature of a peace treaty might entail recognition of the Oder boundary and the concomitant cessions of German territory to Poland and Russia. The weight of this factor may be calculated by estimating the degree of likelihood that the Soviet Union would consent to the peaceful re-annexation of East Prussia and Silesia by a reunified Germany. (The DDR has, of course, dutifully and formally accepted the Oder-Neisse boundary.) Moreover, I do not think there are many nations, in or out of the Communist bloc, which would much relish the active assertion of such claims by a unified Germany. A peace treaty need not and should not give any countenance to East German claims to sovereignty over, or (what is practically the same thing) control of access to, West Berlin, which, as above noted, seems to be the one vital matter.

One more problem: Suppose we do in effect accept the *status quo* in East Germany in exchange for Russian acceptance of the *status quo* in West Berlin; what assurance have we that the new promises will not, like the old ones, be broken whenever the Kremlin decides again to put the squeeze on West Berlin? The only answers to this legitimate question are *first*, that it is common to all agreements with nations about whose honesty we are skeptical; and *second*, any understanding should condition our acceptance of their *status quo* upon their acceptance of our *status quo*, so that a breach would relieve us of our obligation and leave us in no worse position before. Neither side would surrender anything more tangible than a possibility of making trouble for the other. If, in the last analysis, the *status quo* rests upon a mutual belief that it is tolerable and a mutual fear of trying to alter it by force, it can do no harm, and may do some good, to give each side a plausible reason for acquiescence in that *status quo*.

In sum, these three problems should be disentangled. If it is perceived that there are three horses, of very different colors, there may be room for some useful horse trading. The horse we want is horse *a*. We ought to explore the value which the Soviet Union sets on horses *b* and *c*. In so doing, we may discover a chance of bringing limited but helpful relief to one of the world's sorest points. Mr. Khrushchev's actions strongly suggest that he is not eager to leap into the abyss, or even to perform *entrechats* on its edge, on account of Berlin. A good face-saving arrangement might weaken the forces which push him in that direction.

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THE DEBATE ON TRADE POLICY

Though the coming Congressional clash over trade policy does not formally begin until June, 1962, when the Trade Agreements Act expires, the battle lines are already forming both in Washington and in the labor and business worlds. In his New Republic *article, "The Trouble of Progress" (May 1), Asher Brynes discussed the growing dissatisfaction with a free trade policy, in part because of the rise of foreign imports, and called special attention to recent boycott threats by unions in the textile and electronics industries. Organized labor, he warned, may have made its threats in order to induce voluntary export quotas by Japan and thus forestall more stringent US protectionism, but this is a dangerous game which plays into the hands of those who want across-the-board import quotas. The editors invited comment on Mr. Brynes' analysis.*

The Pinch of Competition

OTTO R. REISCHER

MR. REISCHER, *a consulting economist with EMB Limited, served on the economics faculty of Michigan State University.*

The main thesis of Mr. Brynes' article appears to be that organized labor in the United States objects to economic change. Obviously, his strictures could be broadened to encompass everybody in this country and abroad, except those for whom change would be a source of direct and palpable profit. It is a truism to say that business, labor and communities want the greatest possible protection against vicissitudes of economic dislocation. The question is how we can have economic progress, and not pay too high a price for it.

To say that labor wants protection from liberal trade at any price – or at any cost to the American taxpayer – in line with Solomon Barkin's ideas is incorrect. Judging by George Meany's position on the "Buy American" Act it seems clear that neither Barkin nor Potofsky speak for the entire labor movement. Meany as recently as in his March 21, 1961, letter to the Polk County, Iowa, Labor Council refuses to promote "Buy American" legislation because so many millions of Americans depend on production and sales of export goods. Their jobs would be jeopardized by our refusal to buy goods from other nations. Unable to sell to us, these countries either would have to direct their trade to the Communist world, or their economies would be blighted. In either case the Communists would gain. These are good and sufficient reasons for supporting liberal trade and payments policies. There exists agreement on these matters, and on the desirability of suitable safeguards against and effective remedies for economic dislocation over a fairly wide spectrum of public opinion in the US and other major trading nations.

Organized labor's demand that the personal and social costs of production should be carried by the owners of the business in which workers are employed has now been taken up in a broader form by Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers. Reuther at the April, 1961, Detroit meeting of his union delegates on bargaining strategy presented a proposal to have employers start paying factory workers salaries by the week or year instead of dollar rates each hour. This proposal goes quite a ways beyond the supplementary unemployment benefits currently paid by many firms.

Reuther is not alone in advocating this idea. Federal Reserve Board Governor J. L. Robertson, on February 15, 1961, told a bankers meeting in San Francisco, that, "Such a system would provide for greater stability of income for the workers through increased job security [and would] usher in a new era of growth, stable prices and increasing productivity." Robertson made this statement after describing the state of industry and the industrial worker in present-day Japan.

As is well known, industrial relations in Japan still reflect traditional attitudes. A worker commits himself to an enterprise without the thought of switching from job to job. In general, the business will not discharge him or lay him off except in extreme circumstances; and the firm has the responsibility to continue wage payments to all its employees for the length of their working life. (Only in textiles is the rate of labor turnover large, because women employees marry after a few years of work.)

In February, 1958, when Robertson visited Japan, there was a recession, but little unemployment, because workers were not laid off. An astonishing feature of the recession was that wholesale prices fell nearly 10 percent, whereas in the United States, which at that time also was suffering a recession, prices kept rising throughout. Robertson believes that the employment policies of the Japanese industry "were an important

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factor in the behavior of Japanese prices in that period. And the behavior of Japanese prices and the intensified competitive conditions that were produced have been important factors in the surge of Japanese exports." He sees in the Japanese experience "evidence that something along these lines can be done without stifling dynamic economic growth. The performance of the Japanese economy . . . has been impressive by any standards, and the degree of protection afforded against cyclical unemployment does not appear to have been a handicap."

Before one seriously would advocate fitting the Japanese system into the US scene, a good deal of further inquiry would be needed. But Japan does present a *prima facie* demonstration that economic progress need not be as troublesome as many people in this country believe. Of course, the role of government would become greater than it is now, and the desirability of such a change would be the subject of much debate. Adaptability is the watchword, and upon adaptability depends the country's chance for economic growth.

Adaptability need not be equated with flexibility: What in some instances may seem to be rigidity, as for example the greater obligation employers would shoulder if the American industrial scene were made over in the Japanese image (and the Reuther proposal tends in that direction), may actually prove to be a gain in flexibility when considered from the standpoint of the economy as a whole. The country so situated could then take in its stride new opportunities for expansion at home and abroad, and could take on new areas of competition arising from shifts in the situation of world trading.

There are two sides to the Japanese coin, however: On the one hand it presents a model of relative stability in the face of unusually rapid economic growth. On the other, this rapid economic growth has become one of the chief sources of discomfort for many United States industries and the workers employed by them. This circumstance would seem to call for greater adaptability on our side.

Adaptation essentially means change, that once having taken place, results in the production of more, or steadier, or better distributed real income. But adaptation has its costs, and therefore creates resistance. Governmental assistance can cut the costs of adaptation, make the changeover more palatable, and reduce resistance. Trade adjustment would serve this purpose through providing transitional help to businesses, workers and localities that are hurt or threatened to be hurt by rising competitive imports following a change in trade policy.

One final point: Undue delay in instituting appropriate adjustment assistance measures may be extremely harmful. When economic change takes place without assisted adaptation, when change is imposed on, rather than generated by an area or an industrial complex, it often leads to widespread erosion of the economic base, and spawns distressed areas. Once this stage has been reached, rehabilitation becomes much more complicated and costly because the economic ills are more deeply seated and more widely spread. Examples of protracted blight have been dredged up during the recent debate on Depressed Area legislation in Congress. Many are of such long standing that the process of their deterioration is not easy to reconstruct. But only within the last few years the sequence just described has been taking place in the Borinage coal mines of Belgium, and this is what happened there: High-cost producers to start with, the Borinage mines were included in a widely-heralded readaptation program when the European Coal and Steel Community was initiated in 1950. The High Authority drew up plans for orderly closure of the mines, for relocation and retraining of workers displaced by the advent of the common market in coal, and allocated funds to carry out these measures in collaboration with the Belgian companies and the Belgian government. But government and companies boycotted the program, partly for lack of sanctions, partly because for a while it seemed as if the rising market could take even the high-cost Borinage coal. As the momentary boom collapsed, the mining areas slid into deeper and deeper depression. Last year the High Authority found itself compelled to institute a wide-ranging depressed area program for the Borinage mines that could have been helped more readily and at lower cost, had readaptation been carried out.

The moral of the story is that while it is absurd for some parts of American organized labor, not to mention protection-minded business interests, to wish for complete immunity to the ill consequences of economic change, there is a time and a place for effective governmental assistance to dislocations wrought by economic progress. And as the example of Japan has shown, governmental assistance may also be useful in putting a country's economic progress on a firmer base.

GEORGE BRONZ

MR. BRONZ, *a former government lawyer with the Treasury Department, is a practicing attorney specializing in international trade proceedings before various government agencies.*

If public opinion on import policy were to be measured by counting pages of the *Congressional Record*, resolutions of state legislatures, speeches at trade association conventions and testimony before Congressional com-

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mittees, the country would appear to be more thoroughly protectionist than ever before in its history. While liberal trade policies have, on the whole, characterized government policy since the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act in 1934, liberal traders are far more diffident in public debate than the protectionists. Not only are they far behind in volume of argument; even more significant, they seem to accept too lightly some of the factual premises of their opponents.

In the face of the typical protectionist woeful account of the loss of business, loss of jobs and loss of profits in a particular industry, all attributed to imports, the liberal trader rarely disputes the statements of purported fact, but is inclined, rather, to defend the reduction of trade barriers for the greater good which might be achieved. Thus, the economist is likely to argue that our economy will be stronger in the long run for specializing in the industries in which we have the "comparative advantage," the political internationalist that expanding world trade is vital to holding the good will of foreign countries, and the spokesmen for export industries that without imports we could not export. In fact, it is in their array of "statistics" that the protectionists are almost invariably the most vulnerable.

The textile industry is a striking case in point. No industry has been louder or more persistent in seeking more and more protection. It has followed this policy in fair weather and foul for at least a century. Since textile imports have always been so small, the domestic crusaders for protection have had the greatest difficulty producing figures to make their claims of injury from imports persuasive. For many years they usually had to make do with (1) a comparison of current imports with previous levels, without pointing out how trivial both figures were, or (2) selecting a particular variety of cloth to demonstrate a high import share, *e.g.* velveteen, which only one domestic mill produces. Now their statisticians have contrived a method of presenting over-all figures. Instead of showing the volume of imports of cloth (the traditional end-product of the textile industry) compared with domestic cloth, they lump together all imports ranging from yarns (which are then woven into cloth and, eventually, sewed into garments, in the United States) to finished apparel (often incorporating American cotton or American synthetic filaments, and, at times, American cloth) to contrive a total of "textile" imports into the American market which looks impressive.

The facts, readily available from official statistics, are: (1) imports of cloth supplied fractionally more than 4 percent of the domestic market in 1960, much of it specialty goods that are not available from any domestic manufacturers; (2) exports of American cloth just about equalled imports of foreign cloth in 1960 (in earlier years, exports substantially exceeded imports); (3) if the garment industry be the one in question, imports are much smaller and exports much larger than in the case of textiles; (4) the textile industry has long been one of the most heavily-protected domestic industries, and remains so today; and (5) the emergence of a half-dozen giant textile companies in recent years, based on new high-speed machinery, has been far more significant a factor in the woes of the smaller and less efficient companies than the trickle of imports. The textile industry has sedulously avoided bringing escape clause cases to the Tariff Commission, where these facts might be publicized, except for a few instances limited to very small specialty cloths.

In a surprisingly large proportion of the "escape clause" cases which have been brought to the Tariff Commission by other industries, it developed that most or all of the domestic producers quoted uniform prices, down to well beyond the decimal point. Imports were supplying the only price competition. The current attention directed to identical bids in response to government invitations underscores the problem. In the area of government procurement, the Buy-American Act provides a special discrimination against imports super-imposed on the tariff.

Imports, if afforded a reasonable opportunity to sell here without too much of a tariff burden can and do provide a powerful stimulus to price competition. The cry for protection against imports is often a plea for government help in sheltering a scheme (or practice) of price uniformity.

The importance of the competition provided by foreign goods is too often neglected in today's apologetic argumentation against high protection. In the great tariff debates of the 19th Century, the advantages to the United States afforded by admitting foreign goods, and thus widening the opportunities for competition in price, quality and variety, were very much in the forefront of the arguments of the liberal traders. Their successors today tend to apologize for subjecting domestic industry to competition, and tell us we must accept sacrifices for foreign policy objectives.

Since the war, our exports have consistently exceeded our imports by a wide margin, and in 1960, the margin widened over the preceding years. If domestic products can sell so successfully in foreign markets, where they are never favored, and often discriminated against, by the restrictive policies of other governments, we need have no fear that American manufacturers are fundamentally vulnerable to foreign competition. Foreign goods competing in our market are a healthy influence in keeping our economy competitive. Foreign goods which are better or more attractive or cheaper enrich America; we should eagerly seek them. Liberal trade policies need no apology.

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Appropriate Academic Dress

The Johns Hopkins University is about to become respectable again. That is, at least, the cheerful interpretation that some friends of the university put upon the news that the Army has kicked it out as manager of the Operations Research Office, at Bethesda, Maryland. The arrangement had its origin in World War II, when the Army, in need of certain scientific data not available, turned to the universities and asked them to put their research personnel to work on specified problems. In consideration of this service the Army paid subsidies to the university. After the shooting stopped the arrangement was continued as regards the Johns Hopkins and a special facility, now employing 450 people, was set up across the Maryland line.

But it now appears that there was a basic misconception in the deal. The university understood that it was hired to find the facts. The Army understood that it was hired to find such facts as the Army wanted found, and no others. For instance, when the university found as a fact that the radar system is inadequate, the Army was displeased. When it found as a fact that the Army is using obsolete machine tools, the Army was displeased again. And when it made an analysis of the Soviet economic system that didn't serve Army purposes the Army was so displeased that it fired the university.

Which is a good thing, an excellent thing. In the past 85 years the Johns Hopkins University had built up quite a reputation for investigations that extended the boundaries of knowledge; and as a matter of course what it discovered it published to the scientific world.

Its reports have been received, like those of other first-rate universities, subject to the possibility of error, but not to the possibility of mendacity. It was inconceivable that the university should willfully lie, either by making a statement known to be untrue, or by omitting a relevant statement known to be true. For that reason it should never, except in dire emergency, be intimately associated with the war-making machinery, for deceit is one of the recognized weapons of warfare.

For that reason, the news that the Army will henceforth recruit its own corps of hired liars, for they will not be supplied by the Johns Hopkins University, is good news to friends of the university. It is bad enough to have the science of physics prostituted to the service of death, not life; but it is far worse when all learning is supposed to be subject to the peace-time draft and research men are regarded as armorers first and seekers after truth second. For truth cannot be relegated to a secondary place. It comes first, or nowhere.

It is setting up a false analogy to assert that when young men are conscripted for military service, college professors ought to be willing to devote their brains to the national defense. They do. The Army can never understand it, because it is a flat contradiction of military science, but truth is, in the final analysis, a stronger element of national defense than lies. For deceit is momentary, but truth is permanent. At the very instant of its triumph, the instant when the ambuscade is uncovered, the lie is finished and cannot be used again, unless the enemy is phenomenally stupid. But truth is a strong point that may be overwhelmed, but, if recaptured, is as useful as ever.

Every university dedicated to the discovery of truth and nothing but the truth is an element of national defense. "The truth shall make you free" is not only good religion, it is good politics; and if the military mind cannot comprehend it, that only shows the limitation of the military mind and reinforces the importance of civilian control of military power.

When an armed enemy threatens us with invasion and conquest, the universities must go to war along with everyone else – the young men, the factories, the farms and the churches. But when the artillery falls silent, the business of the Johns Hopkins University is not making war but consolidating peace, and it should take off the olive drab and revert to cap and gown.

For peace is the only national defense that is certain, and making peace calls for more exact knowledge and higher skill than conducting a military campaign. It is the function of the universities to furnish an important part of this knowledge and skill, and they become suspect when there is reason to believe that they are applying part of their time and energy to the opposite purpose – to deception and the laying of traps.

Giving basic military training to students is altogether different. There is no fraud about that, and students in uniform are acquiring knowledge that may save their lives in case of war. But it is not for the learned doctors on the faculty to stand at attention and salute at the word of command. Their share in national defense is apart from all that.

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Beyond the Middle Years

by Irving Howe

With his early novels, Ignazio Silone won for himself not merely international fame but something far more precious to the serious writer: a public of his own, a fraternity of readers who felt themselves to be his secret friends. Silone could go anywhere in the world and find men who, having like himself

The Fox and the Camellias
by Ignazio Silone
(Harper; $3.50)

experienced the failure of socialism, would immediately know how to value the muted slyness and sadness of his books, quite as old companions can speak to one another through a shrug or a smile.

Then something happened, both to Silone and the relations he had established with his readers. The crisis of the middle years, when a writer must preserve the continuity of his vision while refusing the death of repetitiveness, was an especially harsh one for Silone. The novels he now wrote, such as *The Seed Beneath the Snow* and *A Handful of Blackberries*, still displayed patches of his special realism and humor, but they suffered from his exhausting struggle with his own beliefs, the struggle of a socialist who has abandoned his dogmas yet wishes to preserve his animating values. These novels seemed a little sluggish in their moralism, a trifle flaccid in their straining toward primitive Christian virtue. Irony, to be sure, survived in Silone's work, but not enough of it was now directed toward his own predispositions of thought. His friends continued to respect him, but some – mistakenly, I believe – stopped reading him. For it seemed to them that he was surrendering too much of his power of sophistication and yielding too completely to that pastoral impulse which, while always present in his work, had been held in check by his essentially cosmopolitan and sardonic imagination.

In his two most recent novels – *The Secret of Luca*, published in English in 1958, and now *The Fox and the Camellias* – Silone has managed a notable recovery, demonstrating that he is a writer who refuses to remain content with his own achievement and keeps searching for new themes and forms. Though never a literary modernist (Verga, not Joyce, is his master), Silone has always been an original writer, most notably in his use of anecdote as a major element in narration and in his readiness to employ the novel as a medium of conversation with the reader. His two latest novels show that in his quietly restless way he has broken past the crisis of the middle years, not in the sense that he has solved his problems of belief but in the sense that he now writes with the ease of a man who realizes these problems will stay with him until the day of his death.

The form Silone has developed in these recent books is peculiarly adapted to his intellectual condition. He now favors a brief, compact and unadorned narrative, with very little of his earlier richness of anecdote or contemplation. The validating detail we associate with the novel as a genre is almost entirely absent. Silone drives his events forward with such a singleness of purpose that one soon realizes he has some commanding idea in sight; yet these tales – for they are more tales than novels – do not succumb to the abstractness or didacticism of allegory. They demand to be read, at all but one crucial point, as accounts of ordinary human experience. I would be inclined to call them realistic fables: realistic in that they are clearly meant as imitations of "real" life, and fables in that they are strictly pruned to the needs of Silone's theme, composing themselves in the reader's mind as a kind of quizzical exemplum.

At the crux of these tales there occurs an incident which breaks with the expectations of familiar realism and requires from the reader an act of faith. In *The Secret of Luca* it is the possibility that an illiterate peasant would be ready to spend twenty years in prison so as to protect the honor of a woman he loved; in *The Fox and the Camellias* it is the possibility that a Fascist spy would be so overcome with guilt over betraying political enemies that he would commit suicide. Both of these events place a certain strain upon our sense of credence, but in the setting of Silone's books they come to represent his demand, at once imperious and relaxed, that we share with him a belief in the recurrent possibility of goodness. Just as the slightness of form in these books signifies Silone's tacit awareness that he now lives on an intellectual margin, so his own break from strict verisimilitude signifies his consequent need to tax us with moral expectations.

And in both books there is also something that is equally rare in modern literature: the effort to present a truly honorable man. Daniele, the hero of *The Fox and the Camellias*, is a former skilled worker turned farmer who lives in Switzerland and is active in the Italian anti-Fascist underground. Daniele is entirely free of the sententious-



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ness and saintly aspirations of Silone's earlier figures – indeed, the book contains a striking repudiation of asceticism – and for that reason he is a beautifully-realized character: a man of sharp wit, capable of risking his life for an idea yet hard-headed in both his work as farmer and role as head of a family, irascible and annoying in manner yet representing in himself that humane impulse which is the heritage of the best in European socialism.

Into the affectionate and tranquil circle of Daniele's home there comes a secret Fascist agent who pretends to, or perhaps does, fall in love with Daniele's daughter Silvia, a girl of fine feeling and intelligence. The secret agent then manages to come upon Daniele's papers and thereby almost to disrupt the underground. For Silvia this is a terrible blow, both to her own burgeoning emotions and to her sense of loyalty to her father. It is here that Silone releases his surprise: the secret agent kills himself out of remorse – and so determined is Silone to stress the apparently gratuitous aspect of this event, to insist upon treating it as an act of faith between writer and reader, that he does not even trouble to represent it directly. Back at the home of Daniele, the family begins to reknit its life and Daniele himself, wearied and aged but still a man of good feeling, remarks to his younger daughter: "I'm sorry about the young man.... He wasn't a bad young man."

What gives this fable of remorse and forgiveness its special strength is the relaxed assurance with which Silone tells it. No one in the world knows these people as well as he, no one else can so thoroughly endow the paradigmatic scheme of his tale with so many shrewd touches of humor and observation. Everything is drawn with a pungent wryness and clarity, everything told with that speed which comes to a writer who has gained a final mastery over his subject. If *The Fox and the Camellias* wins one's affection as a portrait of men in moments of trouble and solidarity, it engages our reflective interest as a plea for the idea of *the possible*, without which life would be unendurable. Perhaps the one complaint that can be ventured is that in the ripeness of his career Silone should content himself with a form inherently minor; but it is a complaint one dares murmur only out of the ingratitude of affection.

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Gentleman from Idaho

by Gerald W. Johnson

"He speaks for righteousness, votes with the boys, and bursts into tears."

This characterization or, if you will, impalement of William E. Borah was made in the reign of Good King Cal by Hamilton Owens, then editor of *The Baltimore Evening Sun.* It was sufficient at the time; and it is almost, but not quite sufficient for Borah's latest biographer, Marian C. McKenna, who is friendly, but not idolatrous toward her subject. She notes that Borah's eloquence and tears were backed by a tremendous courage that commanded the respect even of those who hated him most; and she will not tolerate even a suggestion of hypocrisy in the man's character.

Borah
by Marian C. McKenna
(Michigan; $7.50)

She is probably right. The fact nevertheless remains that he *did* speak for righteousness, he *did* vote with the boys, and he *did* burst into tears, leaving rational observers no alternative but to suspect him of rank hypocrisy. Here, then, is a subject for philosophical inquiry: how could any honest man furnish such convincing evidence of being what he was not? After reading this book one inclines to the belief that the answer in this specific case is, because he was 140 percent American.

Borah's conspicuous fault Mrs. McKenna describes as political immaturity, but it may be plausibly argued that the immaturity was a symptom, not the disease. The disease was a moral certainty so colossal as to touch, if not to cross the verge of psychopathology; and if that is not a conspicuous fault of the typical American, then all students of the species, from Crèvecoeur to Khrushchev, have been in error.

Borah's was the textbook case of this malady. When any politician takes a high tone his enemies are certain to say of him, "the fellow thinks he is God." But ordinarily that is the testimony of a hostile witness. Borah is the only one who is on record as admitting it. McKenna quotes him as saying in 1919, "the President [Wilson] is in favor of a League of Nations. If the Savior of mankind would revisit the earth and declare for a League ... I would be opposed to it." This claim that his capacity to judge truth was superior to that of Jesus Christ surely must be without parallel in the history of US politics. Perhaps some others may have held the like opinion of themselves, but they held it secretly; this man alone acknowledged it publicly.

Twenty years later, just three months before the outbreak of war in Europe, Borah informed the Secretary of State that there would be no war in 1939; and when the startled Mr. Hull pointed

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out that all his reports indicated that war was at hand, Borah declared that his sources of information were superior to those of the State Department. This created a sensation but one wonders why. A man who boasted that he could not be convinced by the Second Person of the Trinity certainly could not be convinced by Cordell Hull.

This divorce from reality is familiar enough not merely to psychiatrists, but also to laymen, who call it fanaticism; and it is a defect serious enough to bar a man forever from the highest rank of greatness. It is unusual, though, to find it connected with as many of the other elements of greatness as Borah possessed. For he had everything else – a powerful intellect, a genuine altruism, enormous energy, and, above all, that steely courage without which all other virtues are feeble and ineffective in public life. He was loaded with minor virtues, also – courtesy, magnanimity, loyalty, and amiability in personal relations. After "loyalty" some will put a question mark, remembering that Borah was a Republican only every fourth year. But he was loyal to every man and party that remained loyal to him or, rather, to the ideals that he cherished.

Measured by whatever yardstick, the man was large. Even when he was wrong, he was wrong in the grand manner. It was not Borah's headlong frontal assault that destroyed the League of Nations; it was the sly and devious parliamentary maneuvers of Lodge that confused the issue until some – possibly a great many – honest Americans voted for Harding in the belief that that was the way to get a better association of nations.

It is this aspect of the man that the biographer has chosen to emphasize, without concealing or condoning the other aspects. The result is a work that deserves the respectful attention even of those who are still bemused, still uncertain whether the net result of Borah's life and labors was for good or for ill. Mrs. McKenna does not resolve that doubt, but two other things of value she does do – she presents a psychological study so complex, rich and challenging that it might well be the inspiration of a dozen novelists; and she sounds a loud, clear warning against trusting a political leader who knows beyond peradventure that his conception of the truth is the only valid conception. That goes for more than political leaders – it applies to anyone tempted to adopt the popular American policy of making up our minds *in vacuo*, thereby avoiding any need to consider the facts.

TELEVISION

Time for the Talkers

There is one small group of television celebrities who do not even pretend to be singers, dancers, comics, performers of magic, or experts at guessing games. They just talk. In some cases they do not even do that very well. But they are durable and I am beginning to wonder if they endure precisely because they are devoid of talent.

Take Ed Sullivan. He has survived through a decade during which the public supposedly grew tired of Sid Caesar, George Gobel, Red Buttons, Wally Cox, Milton Berle and a dozen similarly gifted performers. If, fifteen years ago, one set out to predict who was going to hit it big in television and, what is more, stay on top, the name of the frozen-faced columnist would probably be way down on the list. But Sullivan goes on and on.

It used to be said that his success was due to the ability to put together a good vaudeville show. The ones I saw struck me as something less than sparkling. The last time I looked in, for instance, the show was being done from Las Vegas and starred Jerry Lewis. Without him it would have been a complete bust. Ed Sullivan stumbled through his excessive praises of the stars on the program and had as much difficulty getting on and off camera as he did in the early fifties. But when the curtain came down the Las Vegas audience could not have applauded more generously had they just seen a Fred Astaire special.

By now Ed Sullivan is a Beloved American, like Carl Sandburg or Sam Rayburn. It is a puzzlement. All I can figure out is that there must be some identification principle at work. In a world of clever comics, poised performers, impressively competent singers and dancers, and sure-footed tightrope walkers, Sullivan's appeal rests in being a helpless figure devoid of theatrical skills. He is the nightmare man who wanders out of a PTA meeting and finds himself unaccountably standing under a spotlight in a crowded theater.

Almost the reverse is true of Jack Paar. Paar is extraordinarily endowed with the gift of gab and has an overdeveloped sense of drama. He is a master of persiflage, capable not only of making mountains out of molehills but of making molehills out of mountains. The first talent makes him an engaging raconteur when he is on his good be-

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havior and a headline fixture when he is not; the second makes him a menace, capable of trivializing the most important issues of the day.

On any given program he probably reaches more people than the combined lifetime audiences of Plato, Aristotle, the entire body of Founding Fathers, and Abraham Lincoln. I wonder if out of all the millions of words Paar has spoken over the air there has been one single memorable idea expressed. There might have been. I have not listened that steadily. But when I have, the conversation was trivial.

No one expects Mr. Paar to be a Plato, an Aristotle or an Abraham Lincoln, needless to say. But his audiences treat him as if he were. For instance, the merest mention of a book on the Paar show can shoot its sales up spectacularly. During the recent Presidential campaign, both Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Nixon went to him and submitted solemnly to his questioning.

As television's most successful talker, Paar has accrued vast power. There have been times during recent years when literally millions of people waited with bated breath to hear what he was going to say about the latest controversy he was involved in. When issues of life and death for civilization were hanging in the balance, his latest personal squabble, with the network chiefs or with Ed Sullivan actually dominated national news.

Paar's predecessor on the *Tonight* show, the conscientious Steve Allen, was not content with the trivialities of network banter – and look what happened to him. NBC killed a plan he had to turn over a small proportion of his time on the air to serious discussion of such questions as capital punishment and nuclear war, even though the discussion was to be carried out by actors speaking the words of the world's greatest thinkers. Allen's plan was regarded as needlessly controversial and inappropriate for a variety show. But why a nationwide controversy about nuclear weapons is inappropriate and one like the recent Sullivan-Paar fracas is tolerable remains one of television's mysteries.

At a considerably higher level than either Sullivan or Paar is the versatile David Susskind, who may not be the best of the TV talkers but is certainly the talkingest. Susskind's *Open End* is a beautiful idea and frequently fulfills its promise. When it does not, it seems to me, it is often because he apparently cannot discriminate between articulateness and thoughtfulness. Susskind frequently encourages windbags and fails to bring out others of his guests who may be less aggressive but have more to contribute. But *Open End* is such a long step in the right direction for TV talkers that one hesitates to make even this criticism. Susskind's idea of letting a conversation go on until a climax is reached is admirable. And when he does not overreach himself, as he has on several occasions, there is not a better moderator in the business.

The success of *Open End* points up the inherent weakness of so many talk programs – first, the drastic time limitation combined with sprawling topics, which usually means that the subject is only skimmed, nothing seems settled when the program has to go off the air, and there is a general sense of frustration on the part of both the talkers and their audience; and, second, the desire above all to put on a good show, which means that positions must be neatly and often falsely polarized. The result is that the spokesmen on hand tend to be either true believers and propagandists of one kind or another or sharply contrasting personalities, whose very extremeness, though it makes for a lively performance, distorts the question under discussion. The sacred watchword is that "both sides" must be represented, but the "both sides" approach rarely allows for discriminate judgment. By freeing his program of time limitations and having five or six different talkers, Susskind avoids this.

In his memorable speech to the National Association of Broadcasters last month, FCC Chairman Newton Minow pointed out that "a glance at next season's proposed programming can give us little heart. Of 73 and a half hours of prime evening time, the networks have tentatively scheduled 59 hours to categories of action-adventure, situation comedy, variety, quiz, and movies." That does not leave much time for the talkers, does it? JOHN COGLEY

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MOVIES

From the Country of the Blind

Kanal (Frankel-M.J.P. Enterprises)
Ashes and Diamonds (Janus)
The Pleasure of His Company (Paramount)

Andrzej Wajda is one of the young Polish directors who are responsible for the feeling abroad that the post-war Polish film has had an impressive renascence. None of Wajda's films had, until recently, been shown publicly here, so last summer in London I hurried to see *A Generation*, the first of his trilogy about the Second War and its effect on Polish youth. I found it disappointing: a merely acceptable film about the political awakening of a young factory-worker during the Nazi occupation, which was commonplace in story and characterization and which in style seemed a pastiche of various Soviet and French directors.

Now the two other parts of the trilogy have arrived here, and they do not lift the disappointment. *Kanal* (which means "sewer" in Polish) is a film of the Warsaw uprising in 1944 and of an attempt by some trapped Polish fighters to escape the Germans by traveling through the sewers of the city. The sense of trudging for hours hip-deep in slime is so well-conveyed that even your olfactory nerve is suggestively stimulated. But the characters are those of any "resistance" picture, with a touch of the Lost Patrol thrown in, and when a voluptuous long-haired blonde of easy virtue rejoins the group just in time to wade out with the young hero, you become well aware that you are in Movieland. The incidents, choice of shots, and emphasis are not only trite but egregiously artificial for this subject. It is only that subject – the factual basis of the film – that holds us at all. While we dismiss Wajda's transparent contrivances, we cannot forget that Polish patriots were murdered by Germans in the autumn of 1944 as Soviet forces sat across the Vistula and waited.

Ashes and Diamonds is about internal political faction at the end of the war and has the highest surface gloss of the trilogy. It tells of one day in the life of a young anti-Communist Pole, hired to liquidate a Communist labor leader, who kills the wrong man and then stays overnight in a provincial hotel to kill the right one. The film combines the worst of two widely different artistic styles. On the one hand it is full

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
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of unsubtle character actors in unsubtle character parts (the pompous young secretary, the drunken old editor), all contributing tiresome little cameos in pseudo-Moscow-Art-Theater tradition. On the other hand the hero, complete with dark glasses, is out of the lowest stratum of diluted American realism: taciturn, sexy, soulful though brutal, a rebel without a Dean. As in all cheap "serious" American fiction, he is in bed with a girl a few hours after they meet, and both of them find it a poetic experience, with much tristful staring into the dark.

The youth kills his man as fireworks go off symbolically in the sky. His own death at the end is stupidly contrived and is protracted so extraordinarily that I thought he was going to stumble on into another film where he would make his first entrance wounded.

It should be noted that the picture is carefully neutral in politics. Virtues and defects are fairly doled out both to Communists and their opponents.

The slang term "small-town genius" seems appropriate to Wajda. He has seen a lot of films, is honorably ambitious, and is not untalented; but he lacks taste and originality. At a guess, he is a one-eyed man in a kingdom where most, for one reason or another, are now blind. He needs a more demanding audience close to home.

To turn from views of war through European eyes, let us consider an American comedy, but briefly. *The Pleasure of His Company* is one of the artificially inseminated Broadway spawn that are born with silver schedules in their mouths: first, New York success, then films, then the road and London and points east, then years of summer stock. Its loot-laden destiny is as dependable as the audience that perennially wants to see this sort of interchangeable play. (They could just as well see, for instance, *The Marriage-Go-Round* instead and would probably never know the difference.) The plot idea, which is not unamusing, is about a father, long separated from his daughter, who rediscovers her just before her wedding and tries to steal her from her fiancé to be his traveling companion; but the dialogue by Samuel Taylor and Cornelia Otis Skinner has no sparkle or bite, only a wish to be like everything else that has succeeded.

George Seaton's direction never gets off its fat Technicolor haunches, and Lilli Palmer's beauty (as the mother) does not compensate for her lack of any shred of comic talent. Debbie Reynolds, the daughter, has considerably more than a shred, but Seaton seems to have numbed it. Fred Astaire plays the father as if he were waiting for song-and-dance cues, still the film's one aesthetic reward is watching him move. (The only dancing he does is at a ball.) Tab Hunter, to be quite candid with the reader, appears as the fiancé.

There are probably others who are affected as I am by comedies like this. They make me feel sad – and somehow even sadder in those few moments when I laugh. STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

The New Republic *welcomes communications in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less are most suitable for publication.*

Kennedy's Farm Program

Sirs:

I predict that your position as supporters of President Kennedy will become increasingly untenable, unless you are to sacrifice some of your liberalism. I suggest you give his proposed farm legislation a good hard look. It is a high-price, low-consumption system; as anti-social as anything the Republicans ever did!

The ideal economic/social system would concern itself with supplying the *needs* of the people; ours concerns itself only with what can be sold at a *profit*. Many Americans still are undernourished, and still more cannot afford to eat well; Kennedy's solution is to curtail production and raise prices!

R. M. Titus
Boston, Mass.

In reply:

The Cooley-Ellender Bill seeks to stabilize farm prices and also farm incomes. Both have been unsettled for some time by the technological prog-

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ress of American agriculture, which has resulted in a persistent overproduction (by six to eight percent) of farm commodities. This is obviously a problem that can only be handled effectively by dealing with the difficulties on both sides of the supply-demand equation. Through administrative action and separate legislation the Administration has provided for a substantial increase in the food donation and so-called soft currency sales program at home and abroad. The Cooley-Ellender Bill further authorizes expenditures of up to $2.5 billion per annum for these purposes through the next five years. The production control features of the Bill certainly do not provide for any cutback of the donation of foodstuffs. They seek to adjust output to demand, which in this case is the sum of what consumers and the Government will buy. THE EDITORS

Do We Need Tax Bonanzas?

Sirs:

In the June 5 *New Republic*, Alvin Hansen points out that during 1948-1955, private investment in producers' plant and equipment plus public outlays at all levels for goods and services grew at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent, while gross national product grew at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent; and that, during 1955-1960, such private investment plus such public outlays grew at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent, while gross national product grew at an average annual rate of 2.2 percent. On the basis of these comparisons, Professor Hansen argues, *inter alia*, for special tax concessions (as now urged by the Treasury and the President) to stimulate such private investment as an aid to a better record of overall economic growth.

This argument avoids the problem of *why* such private investment growth was so much lower in the later period than in the earlier one. . . . The seriously low rate of overall growth in recent years has been due to the periods of stagnation and recession which have followed rather quickly each boom period. And one of the main factors in puncturing each boom has been the tendency of investment in producer facilities to outrun the combined private and public demand for ultimate products, thus resulting in "over capacity."

I agree fully with Professor Hansen that we need much more public spending, and with his implication that we also need tax cuts, which should be used to stimulate consumption. With these, investment in producer facilities will be high enough without tax bonanzas.

Leon H. Keyserling
Washington, D. C.

The Real Russian Challenge

Sirs:

Harry Simple's analysis (in "The Two Maps," by Louis J. Halle, May 29) of the real nature of the Soviet Communist challenge, *i.e.* Russian nationalism, is perceptive. He suggests that the US has been ". . . frightened by the ideological myth . . . obsessed with a word." Is our faulty perception due to lack of sophistication or is it possible that political, military, and economic interests in the United States are just as hostile to national determinism as they are to Russian expansion?

Timothy O. Blackburn
New York, N.Y.

The GOP in Texas

Sirs:

The first Republican Senator from Texas since Reconstruction days may thank Messrs. Johnson and Rayburn for his election. In 1952, Mr. Sam cast aside the loyal Democrats under the late Maury Maverick, Sr., and in 1956, Senator Johnson completed the job of putting the followers of Mr. Shivers in the catbird seat. From then on, it was inevitable that some day, the Neanderthal wing of the party would eliminate all Democrats who could be distinguished from Republicans, and the electorate would, in a state of raging apathy, choose a Republican.

It has happened, and it is as if a clean wind had blown something evil away. Now the Republicans should field a runner in every race, committed to their party principles. If the Democrats can't come up with a candidate, then we may, and should, go on electing Republicans.

Franklin Jones
Marshall, Texas

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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